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Abstract 
Viewing local finances under the approach to private-public consumption complementarity, we 
conclude that foot voting and tax competition become extinct when the (capital) tax structure across 
jurisdictions is the one forging close ties between the burgher and his/her jurisdiction. Feeling the 
burgher attached to the local public goods offered and to the local business activity, prevents labor and 
capital relocation. The optimal number of jurisdictions is that which is conducive to the adoption of 
that local taxation that fosters such an attachment; taxation made possible by capitalizing upon private-
public consumption complementarity. The intuitive appeal of this result is then contemplated within the 
broader framework of fiscal policymaking accommodative of citizen heterogeneity. In view of 
complementarity, there appears to be scope for decentralized treatment of citizen preferences via the 
localities, leaving the treatment of endowment differences to the central government. 
Keywords: Local taxation, Private-public consumption complementarity, Citizen heterogeneity, 
Burgher-community attachment                                                                                                                           
1. Introduction 
In so far as the optimal local public goods provision – tax rate mix is concerned, the Tiebout 
[1] hypothesis maintains that citizens accommodate their preferences for this mix by “foot voting” or 
the same, through interjurisdictional migration, i.e. by settling down each to his or her most preferred 
jurisdiction, with the optimal number of communities being shaped by this sorting out of citizen 
preferences. In so far as the mix regarding local private goods supply – tax rates is concerned, the 
confrontation of wasteful interjurisdictional tax competition to attract private capital presupposes a 
limited only number of localities at the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (Hoyt [2]). The same result obtains 
when “the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are 
selected by majority voting” (Perroni and Scharf [3, p.133]). Which is then the optimal number of 
localities, the one that would not change in response to tax competition?  
Assuming that the relevant tax is that on capital, this question translates to finding the capital 
tax structure across communities, which would not induce burgher relocation, and from which no 
community would have an incentive to deviate. Private investments in a locality create jobs and 
incomes to be consumed while public expenditures by a locality aim at satisfying burgher demand for 
the goods provided through them. Evoking upon the complementarity between private and public 
consumption in the sense of private consumption responding positively to an increase in public 
spending (Fiorito and Kollintzas [4], Linnemann [5], Bouakez and Rebei [6], Ganelli and Tervala [7]), 
this paper maintains that the optimum tax is simply the one which maximizes the individual utility 
from these two consumption types on the proviso that this is the aim of local governments as well. 
Much more so when complementarity (as opposed to substitutability) is certainly the case with the 
public goods that are rival in consumption and whose positive externalities depend on distributional 
and demographic characteristics as is this case with the local public goods.  
From still another point of view, as soon as term “public consumption” refers to consumption 
of public goods and hence, to the public investments made to produce them, we do know from Ogura 
and Yohe [8] originally and Bucci and Del Bo [9] more recently that public and private capital 
complement each other. At the local level, this implies that a local public project is expected to raise 
the productivity of the private industry situated in the same locality. Taxes are a distortion but under 
capital complementarity, an underinvestment by the private sector may be counterbalanced by public 
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investment raising the marginal product of private capital and encouraging thereby the inflow of such 
capital. The subsequent public investment externalities-spillovers at the general equilibrium setting are 
expected, following Figuières et al. [10], to have subsided at interjurisdictional equilibrium while 
interjurisdictional cooperation to increase growth rates should be sought only if the consumption 
preferences regarding “domestic and foreign goods” allow so. 
In what follows, what is done analytically is to merge Hoyt’s [2] model of the local finances 
with Ganelli and Tervala’s [7] approach to private-public consumption complementarity. What we find 
then is that foot voting and tax competition become extinct when the tax structure across jurisdictions 
is the one forging close local ties for the burgher. These are ties shaped by the private-public 
consumption complementarity despite different tastes in a given community. The intuitive appeal of 
this result is then contemplated within the broader framework of fiscal policymaking accommodative 
of citizen heterogeneity. Complementarity allows communities to handle efficiently heterogeneity in 
preferences, leaving endowment differences to be dealt with by the state. 
2. The Model 
We shall first model the locality in line with Hoyt [2] to combine it next with the modeling of 
the burgher following Ganelli and Tervala [7]. 
2.1 The Locality 
A single private good is assumed to be produced in a given locality, which is providing a 
single public good, based both production processes on mobile labor and capital. Let the local 
government budget constraint be  
 
where  is the tax per laborer  on the capital  of the th jurisdiction providing the local public good 
. The ratio  gives the mix of public and private investment in . Abstracting from differences in 
the production technologies used locally, jurisdictional output per capita is  or 
, but total capital 
 
and labor  are fixed so that total per capita output  ) is given too. 
Free movement of capital and labor implies equalization across jurisdictions of the rate of return  on 
capital so that 
 
in each locality. From (2) one obtains that 
 
being presumably the market share of jurisdiction 1, while  is the derivative of the th 
jurisdiction’s demand for capital with respect to the price  of capital at equilibrium. So, if there 
are two only jurisdictions, 1 and 2, the movement of capital from 1 to 2 in response to a tax increase in 
1 will be captured by 
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and 
 
Consequently, from (1) and (5),  
 
 
or noticing that the elasticity of the demand for  is , 
 
where . Finally, private consumption per capita  is given by 
 
where the last term is capital income; . From (8) and (3) one obtains that 
 
which when combined with (7), yields that 
 
2.2 The Burgher 
Eichner and Runkel [11, p.2349] argue that “If the capital supply elasticity is strictly 
positive,… capital tax rates are inefficiently low in… decentralized equilibrium.” This should not be 
the case under general equilibrium, prompting in turn a discussion of the burgher as follows. Let the 
utility function of the typical citizen of the th jurisdiction be  
 
where ln denotes the natural logarithm, the coefficient  is positive, capturing the complementarity 
between  and , (an increase in  increases the marginal utility of  given the negative sign 
accompanying the positive ), while the parameter  gives the elasticity of the marginal disutility 
of producing  with respect to . The disutility of producing  in a given jurisdiction  refers to the 
deviation from the optimal capital-labor ratio following labor relocation.  and  reflect the burgher’s 
attitude towards local public goods and private capital, respectively. Letting P be the equilibrium price 
level,  
 
where  
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as it obtains from the household maximization problem given the budget constraint 
 
where  satisfies of course (1), i.e. local  budgets are assumed to be balanced. That is,  
 
meaning that the disutility from trying to restore the optimal local capital-labor ratio following say 
emigration from a locality, should be equal to the utility derived from the consumption of one more 
unit produced towards the restoration of the ratio. Log-linearized, (13) becomes , 
which in view of the equilibrium relationship , yields that 
 
2.3 Analysis 
Now, note that from (14), 
 
which when combined with (10) gives that 
 
in so far as jurisdiction 1 is concerned. Solving (16) for  and differentiating with respect to , the 
derivative  will be zero, i.e changes in  will have no effect on  as should be the case at 
equilibrium, iff 
 
This in conjunction with (1) imply that one property of the optimal tax structure should be that 
 
Or, inserting (14) in , gives that  
 
which by (1) implies that 
 
Note that from (17) or (18),  iff , and hence, . A third expression for  is 
obtained by inserting (17) in (8) given also (1): 
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This is a more complicated expression but it does suggest that  is too a condition for 
. And, since , a third condition is that . This coupled with the restriction that 
, implies that both  and  should exceed 1.  
In words, foot voting becomes meaningless if the burgher “feels” much attached to the local 
entrepreneurial activity and tax competition becomes futile if the burger feels the same attached to the 
local public goods supplied by its jurisdiction. And, the complementarity between private and public 
consumption ensures that “the two feelings” work in the same direction, which the interjurisdictional 
tax structure comes to exploit in order maximize attachment and minimize subsequently migration and 
capital flight. Two burghers differing in tastes may be feeling the same attachment to a given locality, 
which is this attachment that according to (18), (19), or (20) should be the target of policy, not the 
satisfaction of individual preferences per se. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
The nonlinearity, the Mirrleesian character of the optimal tax structure across jurisdictions 
prompts one to think of this structure as a decentralized fiscal vehicle accommodating heterogeneity in 
’s and ’s. It is a vehicle that cannot be provided by the central government but which comes to 
complement the da Costa-Werning Mirrleesian framework in which the central government can 
accommodate the differences in earning ability (Gahvari and Micheletto [12]). Three are the 
advantages of such a scheme: First, localities are absolved from redistributive tasks, which may 
certainly become responsible for regional shifts in population and economic activity (see e.g. Bahl 
[13]). Local taxation in the sense developed earlier, can be optimal only from the viewpoint of 
allocational objectives, i.e. of influencing the geographical pattern of private investment and 
determining the level and mix of local public goods expenditure. Second, the framework of national-
subnational government interaction becomes well defined, assigning the redistributive and stabilization 
objectives exclusively to the state and minimizing the need for central authority intervention in the 
local finances. And, third, the proposed scheme weakens further the need to take recourse to the 
redistributive power of monetary policy and thereby to decisionmaking on the part of a non-elected 
central banker. 
Of course, it all depends on whether private consumption and government spending are 
actually positively related or not. This is a matter of ongoing theoretical and empirical investigation, 
which appears to confirm this hypothesis and needs to expand to local finance as well. What our 
discussion herein suggests towards this direction is that the close burgher-community ties may be a 
reason for the external habit formation contemplated for example by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
[14]. Note that it has been a discussion assuming away public-good and factor congestion and the need 
for such local taxation on mobile firms and households that would internalize marginal crowding costs. 
Once the matter of congestion is addressed, our conclusions here would continue holding if this first-
best local policymaking was possible, and they would be strengthened even further in a second-best 
setting, because as Wellisch and Hülshorst [15, p.6] emphasize, the second-best is one in which: 
“[M]igration does not only reveal the preferences for local public goods, as suggested by Tiebout [1]. 
Rather, local governments have incentives to consider these preferences in a socially efficient way even 
if they only rely on distortionary taxes.” 
We conclude this brief essay by noting that at this abstract level of our discussion, only a 
qualitative description of the optimal number of jurisdictions has been provided; numerical calibrations 
would certainly produce definite results, but would depend on the market size assumed, which is one 
aspect of the issue under investigation that is being researched by itself (see e.g. Casella [16], Casella 
and Feinstein [17]). Another limitation of the calibration would be the absence analytically of a 
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differentiation between first- and second-order administrative subdivisions, between say provinces and 
municipalities, respectively, which is an issue addressed only recently by Auffhammer and Carson 
[18]. Finally, only one tax is assumed as policy instrument available to localities while the presence of 
matching grants on the part of central government to correct for interjurisdictional spillovers (Figuières 
and Hindriks [19], Hoyt [20]) is disregarded, too. 
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